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Abstract 
The important role of institutions is hereby evoked by studying the relationship 
between Cameroon’s foreign debt and its GDP growth. This study observes that it 
could be misleading to set foreign debt management targets on a strictly 
quantitative basis, considering the diversity of debtors and their needs. A 
conceptual framework using the circular flow of resources within the economy is 
used to qualitatively analyze the areas where the flow is subjected to frictions due 
to institutional inefficiency. The country’s readiness to convert its foreign debts to 
gross capital formation, thus stimulating consumption, and earning fiscal 
revenues is studied. Through this, the depth of changes initiated by foreign debt 
management programs is assessed. The changes resulting from these programs, 
especially the latest one, (HIPC initiative) are observed to evaluate how these 
programs have affected decision making within the economy. It examines the 
degree to which the country’s long term immunity to a future foreign debt has been 
enhanced, and also, the chances that the economy can internally stimulate its 
future GDP growth without tuning to foreign debt. It concludes that the efficiency 
of domestic institutions as well as its major creditors has a significant impact on 
debt sustainability. Therefore, the HIPC’ initiative’s failure to adequately address 
institutional weaknesses in the economy, only paves the way for a future debt 
crisis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. Introduction 
Following the oil shocks in the 70’s, until the 2000’s many African economies, 
including Cameroon, have suffered huge balance of payment deficits. This 
phenomenon made foreign debts necessary. Within this period, Cameroon’s 
economy has faced difficulties in the repayment of its foreign debt while 
promoting growth of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product). This situation has been 
met with numerous programs through which international financial institutions 
sought to improve the situation either by awarding loans, changing the terms of 
existing loans, or cancelling loans. This has led to diverse reactions of the 
economy in the periods within which each of the programs was carried out. 
 
This problem therefore created the motivation to study the reasons why the 
economy reacted as observed, following the actions initiated through its relations 
with creditors. This is an internally focused study which is more interested in the 
internal actions or reactions to stimuli which could influence the country’s foreign 
debt to GDP relationship over a period which ranges from the 1970 until 2006.  
 
The theories of institutional economics are applied to explain the results of 
government action. This is done by using the Keynesian concept of government 
spending. By linking this theory to Minsky’s theory of financial fragility, 
determinants of government financing are analyzed. This is done by a qualitative 
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analysis of the flow of foreign debt to capital formation, and the government’s 
ability to trap its spending through fiscal revenues, as the country went through 
economic changes to enhance the efficiency of foreign debt management. 
 
In general, the country’s long run financial fragility is evaluated by analyzing the 
degree to which its foreign debt dependency has evolved within each era of the 
country’s GDP growth, as it responds to actions of international financial 
institutions regarding the degree of institutional efficiency. 
 
1.1 Background 
Cameroon falls among the many African economies which fell into a debt trap 
after the Oil shocks in the mid 1970’s. The world wide rise in fuel prices led to the 
accumulation of cash reserves in western Banks. In the face of recession in 
developed countries, there arose excess supplies over demand of credits, and thus 
a fall in the cost of loans. The low cost of loans, at the time, represented an 
opportunity for African economies which later on became a threat. This happened 
as the western economies emerged from recession and began to compete in the 
demand for credits. This growth in the demand for credits led to a rise in interest 
rates which affected the price to be paid by the Cameroonian economy in 
reimbursement of their foreign loans.  
 
The country’s independence in 1960 came with a lot of optimism, as the average 
real economic growth of 6% was achieved between 1965 and 1986. The country’s 
petroleum resources played a key role in the boom experienced in the 70’s, as 
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foreign reserves were positive, in the face of growing domestic investments which 
rose from 21% of GDP in 1977 to greater than 30% in 1986. This boom was 
characterized by high inefficiency in the management of state enterprises in 
charge of non-petroleum products, and thus enhancing the country’s dependence 
on its oil revenues (Nkama, 2005). 
 
Heightened public sector mismanagement combined with the sudden fall of the 
prices of Cameroon agricultural and petroleum revenues. This trapped the 
economy in a crisis which was recognized by the state in 1987. As a consequence, 
between 1985 and 1992, terms of trade declined by about 55%, while the average 
GDP growth fell to a yearly of 3.8% from 1986 to 1994. At the same time, 
external debt rose from 39% of GDP in 1986 to 65% of GDP in 65% of GDP in 
1992. Then the national currency (CFA franc) underwent a 105% in 1994 (Nkama, 
2005) . 
 
1.1.1 Cameroon’s economic structure in relation to its foreign debt 
Among the goals of the HIPC initiative was the achievement of a 150% ratio of 
net present value of foreign debt to GDP. But this ought to have gotten beyond 
this single quantitative dimension. It ought to have taken account of other aspects 
of the economy, such as its structure, the structure of its foreign debt, and the 
strength of institutions which can make for economic stability in spite of high debt 
to GDP ratios. 
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Fig 1 Sectors' Percentage Contributions to GDP 1966-1976 
Source: Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, & Roubaud, 2000 
 
The heart of Cameroon’s economic boom came in the early half of the 70’s, an era 
within which the service sector supplied half of the country’s GDP. Given that the 
majority of this service sector belonged to the civil service, an important 
component of government revenue could be earned from fiscal sources. The large 
civil service served, not only as a source of fiscal revenue through income taxes, 
but also, as a huge source of current government expenditure.  At the time, the 
country’s agric sector contributed 30% of the country’s GDP, while the 
manufacturing sector contributed 20% of the economy’s GDP as shown in fig 1. 
 
Agric
30%
Manufacturing
20%
Service
50%
Contributors to Cameroon's GDP 
(1966-1976) 
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Fig 2 Sectors' Contributions to Cameroon's GDP 1977-1985 
Source: Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, & Roubaud, 2000 
 
The discovery of petroleum in the country’s South West Coast line in 1970 
influenced the contribution of each sector to the country’s GDP as shown in the 
figure above. The effect of this discovery was perceptible between the late 70’s 
and the first half of the 80’s. The agric sector and the service sector both lost 10% 
and 5% respectively to the manufacturing sector whose contribution to GDP had 
grown to from 20% to 35%, as demonstrated in figure 2. This growth arose from 
the annual 32% rise in petroleum earnings realized between 1980 and 1985.  
After the petroleum discovery, until the economic crisis, only the service sector 
faced a relatively stable growth rate, as the manufacturing and agricultural sectors 
experienced significant growth rate drops. (Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, 
& Roubaud, 2000, p. 18).  
Agric
20%
Manufacturing
35%
Service
45%
Contributors to Cameroon's GDP 
(1977-1985)
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With this GDP contribution structure, the economy fell into a structural crisis 
(1985-1994) as it depended on unstable oil revenues to finance its growing 
recurrent expenses. This called for the country’s subjection to the structural 
adjustment program. 
 
 
Fig 3 Sectors' Contributions to Cameroon's GDP 2009 
Source: IMF Country Repot No.10/259 July 2010 
 
After the Structural Adjustment programme, the sectors which contribute to 
Cameroon’s GDP are classified as shown in figure 3 with resperct to their 
percentage contribution to GDP. The largest component is the service sector which 
earns 44% of the country’s GDP. This sector and the construction sector do not 
yield direct income for the state by which its foreign debt can be serviced. This is 
Agric
25%
Manufacturing
31%
Service
44%
Contributors to Cameroon's GDP 
(2009)
7 
 
because the state only earns taxes from income earned by individuals rendering 
services and executing construction contracts. Thus the state’s ability to raise 
income from this sector tends to depend on how efficiently its institutions can 
spread its tax base to trap revenue from these sectors. 
 
The state is therefore left with the remaining 56% (Manunufacturing, Oil and 
mining, Agriculture, Forestry and livestock) from which it expects to earn 
substancial amounts of foreign income, considering its participation in these 
sectors, such as its 66% shares in the National Refinaries Company, SONARA 
(US Department of the interior, 2009). According to AfDB and OECD (2008), the 
forestry sector realizes income through environmental regulation. Given that this 
sector’s products are not locally processed, it could earn a deeper component of its 
potential by adding the value of its products before they get exported. In the 
agriculrutal sector, the potential is not exploited, due to inadequacy of financing, 
road networks, and fertilizers. 
 
The non-petroleum manufacturing sector holds 19.2% of the economy’s GDP. The 
country’s technological base is relatively weak, as is the case with low income 
less economically developed countries. The trade liberalization which followed 
the Structural Adjusment programme opened the country’s markets to competition 
from foreign manufactured products. It is therefore difficult to perceive this sector 
as a source of foreign income, considering the recent declining terms of trade in 
the economy.  
 
8 
 
It is therefore important to understand how an economy whose GDP arises 
predominantly from the service sector will react to the growing mass of foreign 
debt, considering the need for externally earned income to finance maturing 
foreign loans. Also, considering the relative instability of the externally earned 
income due to export price fluctuations (See Annex) , it is important to assess the 
means by which such a small economy can generate GDP growth from internal 
sources, thus reducing its dependence on foreign debt. 
 
1.1.2 The structure of Cameroon’s Public debt 
 
Fig 4. The Structure of Cameroon's Public Debt 
Source: IMF Country Repot No.10/259 2010 
 
Cameroon’s economy owes 50.7% of its debts to foreign creditors. Figure 4 shows 
its foreign debt structure with a vast majority of its creditors being multilateral. 
This leaves the country with a limited percentage of bilateral foreign loans to 
worry about. In this case, the country’s commitments to commercial bank loans 
9 
 
(which have tighter conditionality than multilateral loans) are quite negligible, 
given that they are not visible in the debt structure.  
 
Thus, the bulk of the country’s external debt is highly concessional, leading to 
more preferential interest rates and longer grace periods. This inspires the worry 
on whether the absence of tight loan agreements (such as high interest rates and 
short maturity terms) lures the economy into the substitution of fiscal revenues 
with these external debts, thus being permanently dependent on foreign loans and 
thus getting caught in a debt trap. 
 
1.1.3 Evolution of Cameroon’s stock of foreign debt and 
GDP growth 
 
 
Fig 5 Mass of Cameroon's Foreign debt Stock 
Source: World Bank Database 
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Fig 6 Evolution of Cameroon's GDP growth,  
Source: World Bank Database 
 
The relative instability in the country’s GDP growth rate between 1970 and 1980 
arose from the discovery of petroleum resources in the country’s coast line in the 
early 70’s; and eventually the production which began in 1978. The price hikes in 
petroleum products during the 80’s “oil boom”, as well as the availability of these 
resources are temporary. This had a strong impact on the economy, as it led to 
investment choices which prioritized petroleum, as well as other non-tradable 
resource sectors over the agriculture and other tradable resources whose prices 
were relatively unstable at the time. This investment policy failed to consider the 
fact that the agricultural sector held a high percentage of the country’s labor force. 
This instability resulted from the need to return to the country’s initial GDP 
contributor mix, focusing on agriculture, after the drop in fuel prices (Benjamin & 
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Devarajan, 1985)  
 
According to Benjamin & Devarajan (1985), by injecting oil revenues into the 
economy, inflation levels rose. This increased the prices of locally manufactured 
agricultural products, making them less competitive on local and foreign market, 
following exchange rate appreciation. This was a challenge to the economy’s 
quest to use import substitution policy as a driver of growth in the late 70’s. 
Therefore, allowing the contraction of the country’s agric sector in the face of oil 
discovery was not a proper orientation of the state’s economic policy. This was 
responsible for the unstable growth of the economy after the “Oil boom”.  
 
In the 80’s the economy faced the effects of the concentration of state investments 
in the petroleum sector. This can be observed from the sharp fall in GDP growth 
in 1982 and 1988, following the fall of the prices of the country’s main export 
commodities: Cocoa, coffee, cotton and petroleum. This led to a rise in the 
country’s current account and fiscal deficits, as the economy fell into an economic 
crisis in the late 80’s.  These deficits were financed by arrears from civil servants 
and local suppliers which escalated into a crisis in the banking sector within 
which the country saw the peak of recession (Gauthier, Soloage, & Tybout, 2000). 
This led to the need to comply with World Bank conditionality, which was 
characterized by the Structural Adjustment program in 1989, which sought to 
restructure the economy. This program’s objectives constituted reducing the gap 
between state revenues and expenses, in order to enhance GDP growth.  
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Within the economic crisis which plagued Cameroon’s economy between 1985 
and 1995, the country’s external debt to Gross National Income (GNI) ratio rose 
to 133% in 1995. Thus, the programs lunched with the help of the major 
International Financial Institutions (IFI), seeking to enhance economic rigor went 
on until the 90’s. These programs had painful effects on those who contributed to 
the “more costly” part of the economy, as they sought to minimize state spending 
and increase state revenues. Among these was the more than 50% reduction of 
civil servants’ salaries in 1993 as a measure to reduce cost. Then in January 1994 
came the 105% devaluation of the national currency (CFA Franc). This was a 
major turning point for the economy following the “oil boom” which led to an 
overvaluation of the CFA Franc. Hence, the country’s main commodities got 
relatively cheaper and more competitive on foreign markets.  
 
In 1997, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility focused on methods of 
maintaining the country’s GDP growth at a 5% level by strengthening non-oil 
sources of revenue, raising savings by the initiation of privatization procedures, 
reducing the country’s external debt burden, and improving the quality and 
management of state spending by allocating more resources to education, health, 
the judiciary, infrastructure and the rural sector. (International Monetary Fund, 
2001) 
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Fig 7 Composition of Cameroon's GDP per sector 
, Source: economywatch.com (2009 statistics) 
 
 
Fig 8 Cameroon's Labor Force by Sector 
Source: economywatch.com (2009 statistics) 
 
Following the quest to revitalize the rural sector, agriculture which plays a key 
role in the economy, as it employs 70% of the country’s population, would be 
expected to be a high contributor to the country’s GDP. This emphasizes the need 
to redirect investment in agriculture after the end of the “oil shocks”. A higher 
14 
 
percentage of the country’s labor force is devoted to this sector, yet it supplies the 
lowest contribution to the country’s GDP. It could thus be argued that country’s 
fast growing foreign debt was not invested in the mechanization of the agricultural 
sector. This process could revolutionize this sector and make it capital intensive, 
by the provision of infrastructure, improved access to markets, and educational 
facilities for improved research in this sector; and therefore have a greater impact 
on the sector’s contribution of the country’s GDP. 
 
GDP growth dropped only slightly from 3.5% in 2007 to 3.4 in 2008 despite the 
global financial crisis due to positive performance of the petroleum sector, as well 
as an increase in the supply of infrastructure and energy.  This relative stability 
was also boosted by programs to improve on the agriculture, livestock, and 
fisheries sectors. But in 2009, the global financial crisis caught up with the 
country’s GDP growth. It dropped to 2.4%, as the global recession pushed down 
prices and demand for the country’s major export commodities: Oil, wood, cotton 
and rubber. For many years, the country has faced the huge challenge of 
stabilizing its GDP. This goal could be achieved by improving on export 
diversification in order to reduce its dependence on oil revenues, as well as 
fighting against falling commodity prices through sufficient processing of raw 
material exports. (OECD, 2009)  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
The economic crisis in Cameroon in the 80’s led the country to experience the 
least growth ever recorded in its history. To reverse the situation, it was necessary 
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to seek external support in the form of loans from the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as other multilateral or bilateral 
creditors. Thus, between the mid 80’s and the mid 90’s the mass of the country’s 
foreign debt grew rapidly. Considering the fact that these loans were granted to 
stimulate growth, an issue arises when one considers the fact that the period 
within which the country’s debt grew fastest was the period within which it 
recorded the lowest GDP growth. This in mind, the high positive impact of 
foreign debt on GDP growth has not yet been experienced in spite of the country’s 
huge debt cancellation. 
 
It is worth noting that after the cancellation of the country’s foreign debt, 
following the achievement point of the HIPC initiative in 2006, the country’s GDP 
growth rate has not improved remarkably. The observed impact of the country’s 
foreign debt on its GDP growth portrays a gap which needs to be filled to achieve 
foreign debt sustainability through improved efficiency of institutions. It is 
therefore important to understand why the long term effect of the country’s 
foreign debt on its GDP growth is still awaited, and to understand the likelihood 
that the expected growth results would be achieved. 
 
In earlier research works, causes of the observed relationship between the 
country’s foreign debt and GDP growth, the debt to export ratio has been observed, 
as well as the debt service to export ratio, to evaluate whether the country spends 
more of its export revenue on debt repayment. It is therefore important to integrate 
the percentage of the country’s GDP spent on capital investments, as well as the 
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efficiency of institutions. This will measure the country’s commitment to the use 
of local institutions in its quest to internally stimulate GDP growth and thus 
reduce the likelihood of a future debt crisis. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 General objectives:  
1.3.1.1 To study the relationship between foreign debt and GDP growth 
This is an effort to test the significance of the relationship between foreign debt 
and GDP growth. Here, a number of economic variables are analyzed. By so 
doing, the changes in the sectors of the economy are assessed. These constitute 
measures of the country’s debt repayment ability and the efficiency of its foreign 
debt management in the past. This will be used to make recommendations on how 
the economy can better manage its foreign debt in the face of an anticipated debt 
crisis. 
 
1.3.1.2 To establish arguments on why this relationship exists. 
To argue reasons for the observed relationship between foreign debt and GDP 
growth, institutional variables
1
 will be observed to measure the country’s degree 
of commitment towards the sustainable monitoring and management of its most 
valuable sources of income, its ability to effectively utilize its foreign debt, and its 
ability to recollect the resources spent as fiscal revenues, and the impact of all 
these on the growth of the country’s foreign debt. Using these variables it is 
expected to advance the argument that the “qualitative” strength or efficiency of 
                                                   
1 Institutional Variables are data sets summarized to represent perception-based 
indicators of governance. These are split into six interdependent dimensions: 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010) 
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institutions is as important as the “quantitative” debt to export ratios. These 
quantitative measures, as suggested by the HIPC initiative, seek to attain a 150% 
debt-to-export ratio, which should serve as a debt sustainability benchmark, in 
spite of the other characteristics of the economy. 
 
1.3.2 Specific objectives: 
1.3.2.1To study the changes in the main contributors to the country’s 
GDP as a measure of the country’s credit worthiness. 
This will present the evolution, over time, of the sectors through which the 
economy earns income, or the major GDP contributors. A decline in any GDP 
contributor demonstrates deterioration in the economy’s debt sustainability 
situation. By observing economic happenings which lead to the major variations 
in the GDP contributors (agric exports, service sector, and the manufacturing 
sector), arguments will be raised on the impact of foreign debt on GDP growth, as 
well as foreign debt management mechanisms within the economy. 
 
1.3.2.2 To assess whether an increasing foreign debt stock 
implies rising government spending on Gross Capital 
Formation 
By comparing the evolution of foreign debt with Gross Capital Formation, it is 
expected to observe whether the accumulated foreign debt is spent on the 
acquisition of infrastructure and technology. A higher rate of spending on capital 
expenditures, following the accumulation of foreign debt hypothetically 
demonstrates growth sustainability for the future. This is expected to pave the way 
for debt sustainability and eventually, result in high GDP growth.  
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1.3.2.3 To observe how the country’s foreign debt and debt relief 
affect the percentage contribution of fiscal revenues to its GDP. 
This seeks to analyze whether debt and debt relief have served as compliments or 
substitutes to fiscal revenue. A complimentary or positive relationship between 
foreign debt and fiscal revenues suggests that the growth in foreign debt and debt 
relief has a positive impact on the fiscal policy performance. Conversely, a 
substitutive or negative relationship between the stock of foreign debt and the 
percentage contribution of fiscal revenues to GDP leads to the claim that foreign 
debt has a dampening effect on the efficiency of the country’s fiscal policy. 
 
1.3.2.4 To identify and explain the factors of institutional efficiency 
which could be responsible for the observed relationship between 
foreign debt and GDP growth relationship. 
Factors of institutional efficiency include: Government effectiveness, voice and 
accountability, Political stability, Regulatory quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
corruption. These variables will be considered within a circular flow framework to 
explain efficiency problems which act as a friction or leakage of resources, thus 
affecting the economy’s ability to generate GDP growth by the use of its foreign 
debt and debt relief. 
 
1.4 Significance of study 
1.4.1 Significance to developing economies 
The debt relief programs, especially the HIPC initiative, mark an important phase 
in the history of low income developing countries’ indebtedness. It is therefore 
important to monitor the changes they initiated in debt related macroeconomic 
and institutional variables. By so doing, the possibility of recurrence of a debt 
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crisis is tested. And the means by which this may be avoided are suggested. 
 
1.4.2 Significance to research and academic bodies 
This is an effort to demonstrate the shift of interests in the execution of economic 
programs through the past, and to guide priorities for the future. It seeks to 
demonstrate the importance of a given economic school of thought with due 
consideration of the environment within which the problem which seeks to be 
solved exists. By this, it is attempted to demonstrate the need to evolve from the 
Classical school of thought that suggests a free market mechanism. It also seeks to 
demonstrate the need for strong institutions in an economy, as a prerequisite for 
the smooth circular flow of resources in the economy as suggested in the 
Keynesian school of thought. It thus seeks to enhance the importance the 
Neo-classical school of thought, especially in low income economies where 
institutions are relatively inefficient. This is sought by paying more attention to 
the role of institutions in the use of foreign debt to generate GDP growth. 
 
There have been arguments on the exogenous reasons why foreign debt fails to 
generate GDP growth. These arguments take into account export barriers on 
products, high fluctuation of commodity prices, interest rates, loan conditions, 
scarcity of concessional financing, and natural disaster in low income economies 
to explain the relationship between foreign debt and GDP growth. Hence the need 
to analyze the same issue from an internal perspective, considering how the 
internal factors have influenced low income countries’ potential to simultaneously 
repay foreign debt and trigger GDP growth. 
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The HIPC initiative turned a new page in the country’s foreign debt history. This 
was characterized by a fall in the country’s stock of foreign debt at the completion 
point from US$ 6 billion in 2005 to US$ 2 billion since 2006 (World Bank 
database, 2011). This has not been met by corresponding changes in the country’s 
credit rating, which has fluctuated from B- in 2006 (Daly & Cavanuagh, 2007) to 
B in 2009 (Beers, 2010) . Thus by understanding the channels through which 
foreign debt is expected to influence GDP growth positively, and gathering facts 
on how this happens in the country’s economy, a relevant amount of contribution 
will be made. This will either support or contest the negligible change in the 
country’s credit rating after the HIPC debt cancellation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2.0 Literature Review 
Birdsall & Williamson (2002) used ratios to analyze the impact of debt burden on 
GDP growth in countries that benefited from debt cancellation through the HIPC 
initiative. They criticized debtor governments for wrong economic policies and 
poor governance. At the same time, creditors were criticized for cancelling debt to 
achieve their own commercial and political aims, rather than cancelling enough 
debt to save these developing economies from the debt trap (Pp 33). Their method 
is strictly quantitative. It pays little attention to the reasons to the reasons for, or 
the degree to which the debtor countries’ institutions influence the performance of 
foreign debt management policy. Therefore, this study comes to disagree with the 
need for increased debt cancellation, to suggest that an increase in the magnitude 
of debt cancellation in the absence of improvement in the countries’ institutions 
and policy efficiency will not have a durable or significant impact on the country’s 
debt sustainability. 
 
Moss, Standley, & Birdsall, (2005) suggest, in the case of Nigeria, that the cost of 
external debt to a low income economy, or the debt burden could be so heavy that 
it crowds out the effects of the government’s debt-sustainability policy. External 
debt can therefore be considered as a major impediment, which limits the 
government’s ability to convince the public and parliament toward the adoption of 
economic reforms. This falls in line with the Cameroon economy’s case, as it 
faced the economic crisis in the mid 1990’s within which, due to large mass of 
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foreign debt, the devaluation of the country’s currency could not lead to 
continuously growing GDP growth rates. But after the year 2000, when the 
country’s debt burden had substantially fallen, the country’s falling GDP ratio 
cannot be justified by high foreign debt burden. 
 
Dijkstra (2006), claims that the World Bank has contributed to the debt 
overhang
2
 in developing countries. She argues that this institution, by 
monopolizing the dual role of Creditor and Controller in the International 
Finance framework, faces an obligation to finance failing economies. In Niall 
Ferguson’s forward in Dead Aid, (Moyo, 2009) he supports this notion as he 
condemns concessional loans. He claims that they are awarded under relatively 
easy terms, which reduce the distinction between these loans and aid. This 
distinction problem makes government control difficult, and suppresses the 
government’s motivation to save and invest. He further suggests that aid 
provided in kind kills the motivation of developing countries to persist in the 
learning process which eventually enforces GDP growth(Pp x). Moyo (2009) 
argues that the unclear distinction between debts and grants in developing 
countries has a negative effect on the commitment of institutions in charge of 
external debt management, and these go a long way to reduce GDP growth. This 
creates the problems of Moral Hazard and adverse selection. This argument is 
supported in this study, but here, the focus is on the domestic economy, and to a 
                                                   
2 Debt overhang: As defined by Krugman (1988), this happens when a country’s 
expected debt repayment is less than the value stipulated in the debt contract. In 
this situation, the country’s output is used to pay off existing foreign loans at the 
expense of investment towards economic growth [Clements, Bhattacharya, 
Nguyen, 2003]   
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lesser extent, on the actions of the international financial institutions. 
 
Cobbe (1990), suggests that the IMF and World Bank are greatly liable to be 
blamed for the failure of their credit allocation programs to generate GDP growth 
in developing countries. Considering the fact that the servicing of foreign debt 
leads to a leakage of resources which would otherwise have been allocated to 
domestic investment, he claims that foreign debt has a negative impact on GDP 
growth. He goes further to question the degree of commitment of the World Bank 
and the IMF, as well as African governments to the search for future solutions to 
the lasting debt crisis in Africa. The African governments are hereby blamed for 
their vague objectives and economic performance standards, which serves as a 
first step in the failure to achieve long term results. This point of view is 
supported, given that in the absence of very high debt burden, the Cameroon 
economy’s failure to enjoy increasingly high GDP growth comes as a result of 
inefficient institutions, both local and foreign. 
 
Todaro and Smith, (2009) consider foreign debt to be a threat to GDP growth 
when the payments exceed revenues, due to mismanagement. They claim that as 
long as these piled up debts are being productively invested in projects whose 
domestic rates of return exceed the market interest rate, these debts could yield 
growth. This idea is countered by this study in the sense that the economy could 
experience high domestic rates of return, yet if the government’s institutions in 
charge of fiscal revenue are not efficient enough to trap a share in this domestic 
rate of return, the high returns on local markets will have no impact on the 
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government’s ability to raise funds, and thus no effect on the country’s high 
dependence on foreign debt. 
 
Yang and Nyberg (2009), argue that the majority of countries that attained the 
completion point of the HIPC initiative still depend to a great extent on a single 
export product for a large percentage of their export revenue. Thus the degree of 
exposure to external shocks, which could arise in these economies, following 
changes in the prices of these products has not been mitigated. Also, it is 
noticed,using the revenue to GDP ratio, that an average of less than 20% of the 
HIPCs’ GDP is earned from the countries’ fiscal revenues. Thus suggesting that 
their degree of dependence on foreign revenues was not improved after the 
cancellation of their foreign loans. Considering the strength of institutions, they 
used the CPIA and KKM governance indices to suggest that despite the relative 
improvements in institutional frameworks, HIPCs’ initiative did not initiate 
changes strong enough to achievement of external debt sustainability. This point 
of view is strongly supported, considering the fact that the HIPC initiative focused 
on making resources available, and cancelling foreign debt, without taking into 
account the means by which these countries’ institutions can be designed to raise 
their own revenues and run efficiently in the absence of debt. 
 
Cohen and Vellutini (2004) argued that the HIPC initiative was not the final 
solution to the debt crisis in low income economies for two reasons: The first 
being very weak practices in the monitoring and management of debt; and the 
second, poor performance and diversification of exports. Hence the HIPCs’ degree 
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of suceptibility to exogenous shocks (e.g. changes in the prices of countries’ main 
exports) has not changed following the completion point of the HIPC initiative.  
 
They questioned the criteria of the allocation of resources to countries in the HIPC 
initiative by seeking to understand the relationship between debt relief and policy 
performance. This resulted from the fact that larger amounts of resources from the 
initiative were allocated to countries with worse policy performance. Logically, 
therefore, this could lead to moral hazard. Here, economies with relatively better 
policy performance tend to make decisions which negatively affect their debt 
burden, as a means to attract debt relief assistance. Following such conditions, 
external debts have a negative impact on GDP growth. This suggestion does not 
quite fall in line with the arguments of this research on one condition. If the 
International Financial Institutions and the economies are both efficient, then 
through the pre-completion point surveillance by the IMF and the World Bank, 
there is no means by which the economies may manipulate policy to attract debt 
relief. But, if the supervisory institution is inefficient, there are chances of the 
HIPC’s to inappropriately manage its economic policy in order to attract debt 
relief. 
 
Cohen & Vellutini (2004), suggest that the HIPC initiative achieved the reform of 
policy which brought about policy dialogue, strengthened institutions, and the 
reduced the burden of external debts. They claim that it improved cross donor 
surveillance through which debtor information may be centralized for better 
monitoring of foreign debts in low income countries.  Also, that apart from 
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quantitative variables like debt to export or debt to GDP ratios, more 
consideration should be given to variables like the quality of external debt 
monitoring and management. This is said to be achievable through the enhanced 
governance to fine-tune ex-ante management of state spending and the 
establishment of loan contracts. They claim that such management will generate 
the information which will increase the selectivity of foreign donors, and thus 
keep the mass of foreign debt under control. This argument is more focused on the 
external part of the foreign debt contract, and covers the information interests of 
the creditors more. This study goes in the opposite direction to study the reasons 
why the debtors fail to maximize the use of these debts. 
 
Kraay & Nehru, (2006) focus on “debt distress” in their study on external debt. 
They refer to debt distress as a period within which countries resort to external 
debt arrears, Paris club debt rescheduling, and non-concessional IMF loans. They 
argue that debt distress is caused by: Debt burden, policy and institutional 
inefficiency, and external shocks which affect GDP growth. They suggest that 
policy improvements have the same impact as the reduction of debt burden, but 
improved institutional efficiency is more important in the fight against debt 
distress in low income economies. This argument is hereby supported, given that 
the financial support supplied by the HIPC initiative was relatively high, but the 
institutional changes were relatively inadequate. This implies that, in the absence 
of relevant changes in the levels of corruption and government efficiency, the 
HIPCs are not far from the next debt crisis. 
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Gunter (2002) argues that the enhanced HIPC initative’s failure to achieve debt 
sustainability results from the inadequecy of resources allocated to this 
programme, as well as the political instability such as wars going on in these poor 
countries. This study comes to argue that political instability has a stronger impact 
on debt sustainability than the adequacy of resources. It can therefore be 
suggested that corruption and government inefficiency have similarly destructive 
impacts on the HIPC initiative’s ability to generate debt sustainability. 
 
Hence, they claim that the use of a single (quantitative) debt sustainability 
indicator: Present value of debt to export ratio is not enough for the measurement 
of debt sustainability in a group of countries which portray diverse institutional 
characteristics, such as diverse governance mechanisms. So, a country’s debt 
sustainability should be measured with more attention to the quality of its policies 
and institutions. This is supported by a strong relationship between the policy 
performance and debt distress. They therefore state that the appropriate debt 
burden of an economy should reflect the quality of its policies and institutions.  
They conclude that the prioritization of aid and concessional loans to low income 
economies could creates an implicit reward to countries that portray poor policy 
performance, therefore weakening their policy performance in the long run. This 
position is supported, considering the fact that HIPC economies do not gain any 
foreign debt management or institutional experience through debt relief programs. 
In this regard, the debt relief programs are a very temporal solution to the debt 
crisis in developing countries. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.0 Research Method 
3.1 Hypotheses 
3.1.1 Foreign debt has a positive impact on GDP growth. 
 
3.1.2 Foreign debt leads to a rise in Gross Capital Formation. 
 
3.1.3 Foreign debt has a positive impact on GDP percentage contribution of 
fiscal revenues. 
 
3.1.4 The institutional efficiency of local and foreign institutions has improved 
the foreign debt to GDP growth relationship. 
 
3.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 Debt sustainability 
Cohen & Vellutini (2004) made allusion to debt sustainability, as one of the goals 
of the HIPC initiative. Debt sustainability is defined as the economic stabilization 
goal sought by keeping the mass of NPV of debt at a targeted level; such as one 
where the ratio of debt to export is less than 150%, as was the case in the HIPC 
initiative.  
 
But this study seeks to argue against the arbitrary 150% debt level, and attribute 
debt sustainability to the efficiency of the country’s institutions. Considering the 
foreign debt to GDP growth relationship, institutions exert strong influence on the 
29 
 
channel through which foreign debts are used to acquire technological 
advancement in the form of Gross Capital Formation. They influence the amount 
of consumption stimulated by government spending, as well as the government’s 
ability to raise fiscal revenue earned from domestic consumption to finance the 
government’s new spending needs and reduce their dependence on foreign debt.  
 
According to the IMF Fact Sheet( 2011), the degree of indebtedness that can be 
tolerated by a given low income economy needs to be set with regards to the 
strength of policies or institutions within the country in question. It was therefore 
suggested that the countries with stronger institutions and better policy 
performance would be able to manage higher ratios of debt-ot-export and 
debt-to-GDP, as illustrated by the following table: 
 
Table 3.1 HIPC Debt Sustainability Thresholds  
 Debt-to-Export ratio Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Weak policy efficiency 100% 30% 
Medium policy efficiency 150% 40% 
Strong policy efficiency 200% 50% 
Table 1 HIPC Debt Sustainability Thresholds 
 (Source: IMF Fact Sheet , 2011) 
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3.2.2 Keynesian Concept of Government Spending 
 
 
Fig 9 Conceptual Framework 
Source: Developed by the in the course of this research; inspired by H.P. Minsky. 
 
The figure above was inspired by the following quote from Hyman P Minsky, 
“Investment must be financed, and how it is financed makes a difference. As the 
proportion that is externally financed grows, fragility increases…” [Minsky, 2008, 
p: xv] 
 
This quote finds its origins in the Keynesian General Theory of government 
spending: Y= (C + I + G + X) / (s + t + m) , where Y: income, C: Consumption, I: 
investment, G: government spending, X: net exports, s: propensity to save, t: 
propensity to tax, m: propensity to inport.  It was motivated by the suggestion 
that Keynes General Theory is not very precise on the constituents of Y. Therefore, 
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Minsky sought to fill up this gap by considering local and external sorces of 
public finance.   
 
This constitutes the conceptual framework which guides the assessment of the 
impact of foreign debt notonly on GDP growth, but also on the sustainability of 
GDP growth. The cycle assumes that economic activity needs to be financed from 
various sources which include: Fiscal revenue, Export revenue, Domestic debt, 
and foreign debt. The economy commits itself to foreign debt contracts with the 
sole aim of orientating government spending to trigger GDP growth. The amount 
of growth generated would depend on how the foreign deb was spent. And the 
sustainability of this growth would depend on the economy’s potential to finance 
itself from internal sources (such as fiscal revenue), and hence reduce the need of 
foreign debt financing, as well as financing from unstable export revenues which 
increases the fragility in the economy.  
 
For the economy to be able to efficiently manage its foreign debt and invest it in 
infrastructure that will stimulate consumption and hence fiscal revenue, the public 
sector, through which the foreign debt flows needs to be characterized by efficient 
institutions. These efficient institutions are expected to have a mastery of the best 
interests of the economy, and therefore are expected to be able to negotiate with, 
guide international financial institutions as they award these loans, towards the 
best interests of the economy, as well as decide on how these loans can be spent in 
order to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign debt financing to the barest 
minimum.  
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3.3 Research Approach 
3.3.1 Data types and Sources 
This paper will apply a Qualitative Case Study approach, and will use secondary 
data. This approach will be used to answer the questions and test the research 
hypotheses. It will consider the economy of Cameroon as a single unit or 
institution with various attributes. Analyses and arguments will be raised based on 
the suitability of policies which arose in this unit to stimulate positive impacts or 
to mitigate the negative impacts of foreign debt on GDP growth over the period in 
consideration. The time frame is further split into four GDP growth regimes: Oil 
Boom, Crisis, Recovery, Post HIPC initiative.  
 
An uninterrupted flow of foreign debt to gross capital formation or infrastructural 
development is expected to stimulate consumption. Through this consumption, the 
government’s ability to earn taxes would determine the degree to which the 
country stays dependent on other sources of income, especially foreign debt for 
GDP growth to be stable. It is therefore worth studying how the system works by 
using the conceptual framework (Page 25), to identify and raise arguments on the 
reasons for the frictions and other failures. These failures keep resources from 
being spent on Gross Capital Formation and stimulating consumption. The same 
failures prevent the government from earning fiscal revenues from consumption 
as expected. These frictions, defined by the inefficiency of institutions, are 
expected to inherently have an impact on the country’s ability to stabilize GDP 
growth using domestic sources, thus the increasing need for financing from 
external sources. 
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The variables to be considered include in the study: 
3.3.1.1 Economic Indicators (1970-2008) 
 External Debt Stock (Public and Publicly Guaranteed, in USD). 
External debt stock is the value of long term obligations owed to foreign creditors 
by debtors within an economy. These creditors should include other governments, 
foreign commercial banks, and International Organizations. The debtors on the 
other hand should include the government, independent public institutions, and 
private entities. The obligations resulting from public or private loan contracts are 
guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. (World Bank, Global Development 
Finance, 2010) This variable will be compared with the fluctuations in the 
country’s GDP contributors, in order to assess the country’s ability to generate 
GDP growth while financing its foreign debt. 
 
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP, in current USD value). 
This is the value of all goods and services produced within an economy over a 
period of time. It includes the total value added by producers within the territory, 
as well as taxes levied on products, less the subsidies rendered for their production. 
This variable is observed in terms of contributors to the economy’s output, such as 
agricultural products, manufactured products, and services. Changes in the 
magnitude of these contributors will be observed to evaluate changes in the 
country’s ability to repay its foreign debt in the presence of economic stability.   
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 GDP growth (Annual Percentage). 
This is the annual change, positive or negative observed in the total value of 
goods and services produced within an economy including taxes less subsidies, 
and it is expressed in percentages which represent each year. By observing 
changes in this variable, compared with the growth in the country’s foreign debt, 
growth enhancing nature of the country’s foreign debt will be analyzed. 
 
 Exports of goods and services (Current USD value). 
This represents the value of goods supplied and services rendered by the country’s 
economy to the rest of the world. These goods include petroleum, cocoa, coffee, 
cotton, bananas, etc. The country’s export services include transportation, 
insurance and information technology services rendered by resident companies to 
non-residents. Considering the fact that the petroleum boom led to a rise in the 
country’s export prices, this variable will be observed to demonstrate impact of 
the devaluation of the country’s currency on its export performance, and therefore, 
on debt sustainability in the long run. 
 
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Percentage of GDP). 
These are additions to fixed assets, including the net changes on the value of 
existing assets such as land improvements and the acquisition of materials and 
machinery, the construction of roads, railways, schools, hospitals, private 
accommodation facilities, etc. By observing the changes in this variable in 
comparison with the growth of the country’s foreign debt, this study seeks to 
identify the degree to which the country’s budgetary deficits and its growing 
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foreign debt affected its acquisition of infrastructure. By this means, the 
economy’s attitude towards long run GDP growth in the face of budgetary deficits 
and rising foreign debt are assessed. 
 
All of the above variables are obtained through internet downloads from the Data 
base of National Accounts held at the World Bank website. The World Bank 
collects this data through the governments of its member states. Standards and 
guidelines for data collection are set by this International financial institution. 
After data collection by the governments, the World Bank tests the data for 
consistency before its compilation and eventual publication.  
 
3.3.1.2 Review of Publications 
 Article IV Consultations on Cameroon. 
Through these documents, the IMF seeks to assess the economic health of the 
economy and develop policies which seek to improve economic performance on a 
regular basis. Results of these consultations, published within the years within 
each of the stages of the economic growth regimes will be analyzed. These 
analyses will supply arguments to support or reject each hypothesis. From this, 
information will be obtained on the sources of friction which impede the flow of 
resources from foreign debt to Gross Capital formation, and from government 
spending to fiscal revenue, thus influencing the country’s ability to generate GDP 
growth from its foreign debt. 
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 Cameroon Economic Outlook Publications and Other Publications 
related to the Cameroon Economy from non-Bretton woods publishers. 
The Breton woods institutions played a central role in the provision of solutions to 
the structural problems experienced within the country’s economic history. To 
enhance neutrality of results, it is therefore important to use non-Bretton woods 
sources in the provision of answers to the issues raised in the research questions. 
For this reason, critical analyses of independent authors on foreign debt 
management in the economy will be useful in the comparison of the existing debt 
related data and the observed GDP growth. By this, the origin and early evolution 
of the country’s foreign debt will be captured to suggest historical root causes for 
the country’s observed foreign debt to GDP growth relationship. 
 
3.3.1.3 World Governance Indicators in six dimensions (1996-2009) 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010) 
 Voice and Accountability 
This measures the degree to which the country’s people are allowed to participate 
in the choice of the bodies which govern them.  It also takes into account the 
people’s freedom to express themselves, to associate, and the freedom the held by 
the media. 
 
 Political Stability and no violence 
This estimates the likelihood of a violent change of government, such as violence 
arising due to political reasons or terrorist action.  
 
37 
 
 Government effectiveness 
This estimates the value of services rendered by the public sector or the civil 
service. It takes into consideration this sector’s independence to political influence. 
It also takes into account the degree of quality of policy conception and 
implementation, as well as the government’s degree of commitment to these 
policies.  
 
 Regulatory Quality 
This measures the government’s ability to conceive and implement policies and 
regulations which make the economic environment more suitable for private 
sector development. This also measures the degree to which citizens respect the 
laws which govern social transaction.  
 
 Rule of Law 
This measures the extent to which citizens trust and abide by social rules, 
including the quality of social enforcement of contracts, property rights, and the 
frequency of violence.  
 
 Control of Corruption 
This considers the degree to which public powers are exercised to yield private 
gains.  
 
These variables are interdependent, and therefore, cannot be considered in 
isolation. But the most interesting for this study are the country’s control over 
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corruption, as well as its government efficiency. The government efficiency 
figures are justified by the attitude of the country’s economic decision makers 
towards the country’s long term debt sustainability, export diversification, and the 
monitoring of major sources of state revenue. These will guide the choice of a 
position in the current debate on whether the observed debt to GDP growth 
relationship results from excessive debt burden with tight conditionality, or from 
mismanagement. 
 
This data is obtained from the World Governance indicators’ data base 
coordinated by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, working 
under the World Bank development research group, in the Macroeconomics and 
growth team. These variables are obtained using an Unobserved Component 
Model (UCM). The authors gathered the results via country surveys from 
individuals, domestic firms, multilateral development agencies, as well as Public 
Sector Data providers. It is suggested that these indicators expected to be strongly 
interdependent on one another, considering, for example, the fact that a country’s 
accountability mechanism is expected to exert significant influence on the 
country’s degree of corruption. [Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2010, p: 5] 
 
Conditional means were used to bundle up data. These averages gave more weight 
to sources providing more information. The measurements demonstrate a 90% 
degree of confidence that the stated indicators fall within the given range. Values 
of these indicators range from +2.5 for countries with more efficient institutional 
environment, and -2.5 for countries with relatively inefficient institutional 
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environment. [Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2010, pp 12] 
 
3.3.1.3.1 Why the KKM World Governance Indicators? 
These indicators were developed within the World Bank research development 
unit. The World Bank, in partnership with the IMF are the country’s important 
partners in its debt sustainability framework. This results from the fact that they 
are involved in macroeconomic supervision, and offer the economy 37.1% of its 
foreign debt (IMF Country Repot No.10/259 2010).  
 
The development of this data by the World Bank in 1996 came after the structural 
adjustment program had failed to produce sustainable results due to inadequate 
consideration of institutional efficiency.  Considering the World Bank group’s 
strong involvement in the management of the country’s macroeconomic stability 
and foreign debt management, this data is expected play an important role in the 
choice of policy recommendations to the developing countries, especially in cases 
where macroeconomic aggregates fail to portray the expected relationship, such as 
that of foreign debt or debt relief failing to positively influence GDP growth. 
 
3.4 Methods of analysis  
The country’s economy has been through three main growth regimes. Of these, 
the third can be further divided into two periods, considering the economic 
happenings within the country. This begins from the reunification of the Eastern 
and Southern Cameroons in 1972: 
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Period I 
 The crude oil boom began after 1972 when the economy experienced a 
wave of eratic growth until the end of 1982 when groth stabilized, in the 
face of a smooth growth in the country’s foreign debt which stayed stable 
between 1980 and 1984.  
Period II 
 The Economic Crisis which ran from 1985 to 1994 when the country 
experienced a transtition from steady GDP growth at 8% to negative GDP 
growth. Within this period the country’s stock of foreign debt more than 
quadrupled.  
Period III 
 The Economic Recovery between 1995 and 2005 within which the 
economy regained positive growth and a relative restabilization of the 
country’s mass of foreign debt. 
 The Post-HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative within which 
the economy’s GDP growth rate remained stable despite the fact that the 
stock of the country’s foreign debt had fallen to close to one fifth of the level 
at which it was four years earlier.  
 
Considering the split of the country’s economic history using the observed levels 
of debt and GDP growth, it is observable that the debt to GDP growth 
relationship is distinct within each of these periods. Thus the findings to answer 
the resarch questions and test the reserch hypotheses will be split with respect to 
these periods. (See figure below)  
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Fig 10 Periodic Partition of Foreign Debt Stock 
Source: World Bank Database 2010.  
 
 
Fig 11 Periodic Partition of Cameroon’s GDP growth 
Source: World Bank database 2010 
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In this light, arguments will be raised based on each hypothesis assessing the 
institutional efficiency of the economy, as government officials serve as agents in 
the implementation of policies recommended by Multilateral or International 
Financial Institutions who stand as the principal. These will be guided by data 
form the World Bank Database, World Governance indicators, as well as 
publications from corporate and academic bodies. 
 
Current and expected behaviours of local and international financial institutions 
will be examined using comcept such as: 
 
3.5 Other Concepts  
3.5.1 Moral Hazard problem: 
This is the situation whereby debtors or beneficiaries of investment projects fail 
to keep the profitability promise earlier made to stakeholders, either due to 
incompetence or laziness of managers (in this case: Government authorities), 
considering the fact that the causes of these failures can hardly be identified 
(Suzuki, 2011, p. 22).  
 
This therefore depends on the investor or the creditor’s ability to bridge the 
information gap which exists with his debtor through monitoring and the 
establishment of appropriate incentives for the keep the debtor’s actions under 
control, in order to avoid mismanagement and laziness of managers. Conversely, 
by setting inappropriate incentives, such as easy availabiloty of credit, creditors 
only help to increase mismanagement and thus the moral hazard problem 
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(Suzuki, 2011, p. 67). 
 
Also, a regulatory structure which emphasizes on the regulation of the regulators 
will have a strong reduce moral hazard (Suzuki, 2011, p. 73). By ensuring that 
both parties in a debt contract do not abuse their rights to their own advantage, 
debtor behaviour can be properly managed, as opposed to systems where the role 
of creditor and regulator is monopolized.  
 
This concept is used by assessing the economy’s reaction to the availability of 
World Bank financing, such as the reaction of the GDP percentage contribution of 
Fiscal revenue to the provision of funds by the IFI’s. A fall in the GDP percentage 
contribution of fiscal revenue in the face of increased allocation of funds to the 
country will indicate Moral hazard and thus increased dependency on external 
financing. Also, considering the fact that the IFI’s play both the roles of creditor 
and supervisor, their behaviour cannot be controlled. The efficiency of IFI’s in 
their regulatory process is observed, as well as the reaction of the debtor economy 
to failures of these IFI’s. In the case of over-stated targets by the World Bank 
(such as the effect of raising interest rates above the optimal level), a loose 
economic policy reaction by the Cameroon economy will be interpreted as Moral 
Hazard. 
 
3.5.2 Transaction Cost 
High Transaction Cost is defined as the economic dimension of friction as 
perceived within a physical system, or the cost of information needed to keep an 
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economic system operational. It could result from the existing intitutional 
structure or arrangement. This phenomenon could be the root cause of 
government or market failures, and may be avoided by migrating to an 
institutional arrangement which allows a lower transaction cost. (Suzuki, 2011, p. 
44) 
It may take two forms: Ex-ante and Ex-post high transaction cost. 
Ex-ante high transaction cost includes the cost of: 
 Determining appropriate trading partners, 
 Deciding prices with trading partners, 
 Setting up written terms which govern trading deals, 
 
And Ex-post high transaction cost include the cost of: 
 Controling trading partners, 
 Ensuring compliance with trading terms, 
 
 
Transaction cost generally rises due to the spread of bagraining power, and 
cultural similarities or differences which exist between business partners. These in 
turn could influence the degree of trust. It is relatively difficult to quantify, and 
can be measured in a comparative institutional manner. But it is worth noting that 
institutional designs which are efficient in one case might not produce the same 
results in another. (Suzuki, 2011, p. 44) 
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By observing what percentage of the allocated funds is effectively invested in the 
years following the decision point of the HIPC initiative, the degree of frition 
between allocation of funds and their investment will be observed. A low 
percentage of investment of allocated funds will be interpreted as high friction in 
the economy. This will indicate a low level of trust and the absence of projects 
ready to be financed, and therefore high transaction cost.  
 
3.5.3 Export Diversification 
Yang and Nyberg (2009) use the concept of export diversification to measure a 
country’s vulnerability to external shocks. This is measured by taking into 
account a country’s export commodities, and evaluating the percentage 
contribution of its best performing exports to its total export revenue. In my 
opinion, therefore, economies whose best performing exports account for less 
than 30% of their their total export revenue would suffer less devastating effects 
in the event of external shocks which come to reduce the prices of these leading 
export commodities. According to Yang and Nyberg, export diversification is an 
issue which has not been efficiently dealt with in most HIPC’s, therefore leaving 
them as exposed to external shocks as was the case before the debt crisis. 
 
3.5.1 Agency Cost 
Davis (1995; p 6), defines agency cost using its origin. He states that under 
normal circumstances, it comes up as a result of differences between the 
incentives of borrowers (agent) and lenders (principal) involved in a debt 
contract. This could result from the information gap which exists between 
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borrowers and lenders due to limited monitoring.  
 
In this case, in the absence of full information on the financing needs of the 
economies (debtors) involved in the structural adjustment programme, the funds 
made available to cover the budgetary deficites would be likely to fail to take 
account of additional information, thus increasing the probability that the 
structural adjustment debt will lead to stabilized GDP growth. This concept will 
be used to justify the argument that the loans awarded in the Structural 
Adjustment Programme were used to cover the balance of payment deficits, 
rather than investment on capital as expected by the creditors. This generated an 
information gap between the dabtors and creditors and therefore reduced the 
expected positive impact of  foreign debt on GDP growth. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0 Results 
Discussion of findings 
4.1. What relationship exists between the country’s foreign debt and the 
contributors to its repayment, and Why? 
4.1.1 Pre Crisis Period (Petroleum revenue Boom) 1976-1984 
In the mid 70’s, Cameroon experienced a new growth regime with the discovery 
of petroleum resources. The realization of these revenues gave room for euphoria 
within the economy, in the face of uncertainty on how long the petroleum prices 
were going to remain stable. This led the economy to an unhealthy level of 
dependence on fuel revenues which were needed to finance current expenses such 
as state personnel remuneration. This constituted a structural problem in the 
economy, as it depended on relatively volatile revenues for the financing of less 
flexible spending. (Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, & Roubaud, 2000)  
 
In the face of high expectation of sustained growth in the size of fuel exports and 
price stability, there was high dependence on expected cash inflows from 
petroleum exports, which were relatively unstable, to finance permanent 
government expenses. The economy experienced more than proportionate growth 
in the contribution of petroleum to the country’s GDP. Between 1976 and 85, 
there was uncontrolled growth in the petroleum sector. This sector led the 
manufacturing segment of the economy which contributed 35% of the country’s 
GDP. It can therefore be argued that this unfavorable export diversification of the 
manufacturing portfolio was dangerous for the economy, as the West Texas 
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Intermediate Crude oil price per barrel fell to less than half, from US $ 28.82 in 
April 1985 to US$ 12.85 (indexmundi.com, 2011). 
 
The rapid fall in the price of petroleum was accompanied by minimal unfavorable 
variations in the prices of other exports such as banana, cotton, coffee, and cocoa 
within the same time frame. It can therefore be argued that for economies which 
play the role of price takers rather than price takers in global markets, heavy 
dependence on export revenue, with a relatively undiversified export portfolio can 
be detrimental to the economy. Aerts et al (2000, p 31) consider the issue from a 
micro perspective. They suggest that the economic crisis results from the fall in 
the petroleum prices as well as the fall in the exchange rate of the US Dollar with 
respect to the local currency. Rather, from a macro perspective, Cameroon’s 
petroleum intensive export portfolio, which accounted for 60% of export revenue 
[Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000], can be sited as a source of 
the vulnerability to Balance of Payment deficits experienced by the state in the 
mid 80’s. A more diversified export portfolio would have eased the absorption of 
rapidly falling petroleum prices in the mist of more stable prices of the country’s 
alternative exports in 1985. 
 
This period thus represented an apparently stable era. The economy witnessed 
erratic growth and a relatively stable mass of foreign debt. The future 
vulnerability arose from the lack of control of export revenues, and high 
expectation of sustained growth in production and export price stability which led 
to increased dependence on these export revenues as the economy experienced an 
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upturn. 
 
Between 1965 and 1985, the driver of Cameroon’s economy shifted from 
domestic consumption to exports, having experienced a period of intensive capital 
investment. After developing strong export potentials, following the discovery of 
petroleum resources, foreign markets got targeted at the expense of local 
consumers, thus shifting the drivers of GDP growth abroad [Aerts, Cogneau, 
Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000, p 20] and therefore exposing contributors to 
the country’s payment ability to external shocks. Given that Cameroon does not 
hold major market shares in any of the products it exports, it has no control over 
the prices of its exports. Its relatively low export diversification makes the export 
driven growth (at the expense of consumption driven growth) a very risky choice 
for the economy, thus making it more difficult predict the country’s GDP 
contributors’ performance and therefore rise up to future foreign debt 
commitments. Rather, by stimulating domestic consumption, and earning taxes 
from them, the domestic contributors to GDP growth are expected to earn stability 
and improve the country’s ability to pay off its growing foreign debt. 
 
4.1.2 Crisis Period 1985-1994 
Foreign debts were contracted within this period to cover the state’s budgetary 
deficits. In the absence of these deficits, debts would effectively generate GDP 
growth. This era, which represents the economic crisis, was characterized by a 
high accumulation of the country’s foreign debt in the absence of accumulation of 
tradable commodities which could be sold to finance the repayment of foreign 
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debt (Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, & Roubaud, 2000, p. 8)  
 
The vulnerability triggered in the economy during the petroleum boom created the 
need for structural adjustment within this period. The country’s economic crisis 
was characterized by the failure of the economy to immediately respond to the 
structural reforms launched in the late 80’s. This is seen in the fact that GDP 
growth is negative from 1986 to 1994, thus erasing the impact of earnings realized 
from the petroleum boom (Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, & Roubaud, 
2000, p. 9), and rapidly increasing the mass of the country’s foreign debt to more 
than three times it value at the start of this economic crisis.    
 
The absence and the very late request for external debt financing after the fall in 
government revenues, led to an aggravation of the balance of payment deficit and 
a rapid growth of the country’s foreign debt [Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, 
Roubaud, 2000, P: 50] 
 
4.1.3 Post Crisis Period 1994-2010 
This period is further divided into two parts:  
- The economic recovery, which followed the ’94 currency devaluation. 
- The post HIPC completion, which followed the ’06 debt cancellation.  
 
4.1.3.1 Economic recovery 
The devaluation of the country’s currency can be perceived as an effort to 
re-launch the economy which had earlier on been trapped in a quasi Dutch disease 
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by the rapid growing petroleum earnings from the oil boom which occurred in the 
70’s. This re-launch followed an over-valuation of the local currency which made 
the country’s non-petroleum exports less attractive on the global markets. After 
the devaluation, hypothetically, the country’s non-petroleum exports performed 
better on global markets. This helped in the absorption of the economic crisis, and 
the eventual emergence positive GDP growth.  
 
In the long term, it can be argued that the devaluation had a by-product of curing 
the Dutch disease through the empowerment of non-petroleum sectors which 
seemed less competitive earlier on. The post-devaluation recovery program 
constituted the Enhances Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) under the 
supervision of the World Bank and related multilateral organizations. It sought to 
stabilize the newly earned positive GDP growth, and not only achieve, but 
strengthen the positive relationship between foreign debts to GDP growth; 
contrary to the negative foreign debt to GDP growth relationship witnessed within 
the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) during the economic crisis (1985-1994). 
The ESAF sought to achieve its results by increasing the investment level, 
emphasizing on institutional reforms, enforcing the economy’s domestic revenue 
generating potential, improving expenditure management, and enhancing external 
competitiveness via a modern civil service and reinforced infrastructure 
(Cameroon Authorities, IMF, and World Bank Staff, 1999). 
 
It can therefore be argued that the effective implementation of these polices would 
achieve tightened monitoring, poverty alleviation, and a relative efficiency in the 
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establishment of sustainable GDP growth. Related polices included:  
 The development of an action plan aimed at improving the 
management and control of public expenditure. 
 Fiscal sustainability program which aimed at increasing the domestic 
government revenues from non-oil producing sectors in the face of a 
falling trend in petroleum revenues due to falling fuel revenues. 
 
Within this period, the government achieved significant progress in its 
privatization program. This led to a reduction of government spending through the 
cancellation of subsidies as formerly state owned companies got privatized. This 
was characterized by the privatization of the Cameroon Sugar Corporation 
(CAMSUCO) at the end of 1998, as well as improvements in the process of 
privatization of the National Palm Oil Company (SOCAPALM), the Cameroon 
Development Corporation (CDC), the Cameroon Mobile Telephone company 
(CAMTEL), the national electricity corporation (SONEL) and the national water 
corporation (SNEC).  
 
By cancelling subsidies expenditure, the state sought to allocate more resources to 
the refund of its foreign debt. It can be argued that the absence of state ownership 
of these companies which provide basic necessities would reduce state control 
over the costs of services rendered within these sectors. This therefore will have 
adverse effects on the alignment of policies within these sectors with 
government’s aim of enhancing growth through poverty alleviation, and achieving 
its Millennium Development Goals of making these basic necessities available to 
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its entire population. By prioritizing profit maximization through private 
ownership, social needs such as consumption of the lower class are compromised. 
This therefore has a negative impact on the durability of the country’s control of 
its foreign debt repayment contributors.  
 
Given the country’s relatively high Gini-Coefficient of 44.56% (World Bank 
Group, 2001), it portrays a high concentration of the country’s wealth within the 
limited higher class of the population. Considering the fact that 33% of the 
country’s population living on 1.25 dollars a day (World Bank Group, 2001), it 
can be argued that privatization needs to be a gradual process, which goes through 
several steps. The first of these steps should aim at reducing social exclusion, and 
broadening the country’s tax base by identifying consumers of low priced 
necessities. By controlling the prices of products within these privatized sectors, 
and including the low income population in the country’s tax base, the country’s 
efficiency in internally stimulating growth could be enhanced therefore increasing 
the performance of domestic GDP contributors, and reducing its dependence on 
foreign debt and stabilizing its GDP growth.  
 
The IMF suggests a symbiotic relationship between capital formation and Export 
diversification by 2005. It observes that the improvement in the country’s export 
diversification can help to further improve the country’s investment in 
infrastructure. But the missing link in this symbiotic relationship is the country’s 
weak revenue side of fiscal performance (International Monetary Fund, 2005). It 
is therefore argued that the establishment of this link would lead a great 
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improvement in the country’s ability to internally generate the resources needed 
for the financing of its capital investments, and therefore stimulate growth without 
depending on foreign debt. Considering the fact that the 2002 policy 
recommendations of this paper (Article IV Consultation 2002) remain valid in 
2004 it can be observed that the economy did not achieve significant improvement 
in its policy implementation. [International Monetary Fund, 2001, p: 6] 
 
The country’s non-petroleum sector on which it depended for export 
diversification was made up of agriculture, lumbering, and electricity generation 
and distribution, the transportation and communication sectors. These accounted 
for the economy’s robustness in the early 2000’s, as the petroleum reserves face 
diminishing output. The export share of the petroleum sector, in spite of its 
downward trend accounts for 40% of the country’s export revenue and 25% of its 
total revenue. [International Monetary Fund, 2001, p: 8]  
 
Considering the relative height of petroleum contribution to the country’s export 
revenue, it can be argued that the country’s export diversification has not been 
greatly improved in the short term, thus the economy remains as exposed to 
external shock as it was before the economic crisis triggered by the fall in 
petroleum prices. This susceptibility to external shocks demonstrates the ease with 
which GDP growth can be affected by foreign debt, therefore making the 
economy permanently dependent on foreign debt as a driver of growth.  
 
The first hypothesis suggests that foreign debt has a positive impact on GDP 
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growth. Considering the fact that the country’s growing foreign debt has been 
constantly used to cover the balance of payment deficits resulting from falling fuel 
prices, and not invested in programs to enhance export diversification, the first 
hypothesis is rejected. 
 
4.2 How does a rise in the country’s foreign debt level affect the percentage of 
its GDP spent on Capital investments and why? 
 
Fig 12 Periodic partition of Cameroon’s GDP percentage of Gross Capital 
Formation 
Source: World Bank Database 2010 
 
4.2.1 Pre Crisis Period 
Until 1985, there was a rise, though not smooth, in national investment spending, 
which could be seen as a means of stimulating GDP growth in the long term, as 
gross capital formation rose from 20% in the 70’s to stabilize at 25% of GDP on 
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the 80’s (World Bank Database, 2010). It can be argued that the relative stability 
of Gross Capital Formation in the pre-crisis period was dependent on petroleum 
income. Given that crude oil prices were relatively stable until 1985, the country 
experienced its record GDP growth in 1978, with petroleum revenues being the 
major contributor. In the same year, the GPD percentage of Gross Capital 
formation hit its all time peak. This implies that the country’s Gross Capital 
formation was strongly dependent on petroleum revenues, but the crisis in 1985 
proved that the stability of the Gross Capital formation depends more on the 
country’s export diversification than on the revenues concentrated on a given 
export.  
 
Within the petroleum boom, the country faced an erratic state of GDP growth and 
slow growth of its foreign debt. From observation, during the two years of 
negative GDP growth during the oil boom (1976, 1980), the country’s percentage 
GDP fell below the smooth trend line. Within this period, the country’s Gross 
Capital Formation fell less proportionately than fall in its GDP growth. Hence, it 
can be argued that the country’s foreign debt plays a vital role in absorbing the 
shocks which could be suffered by the economy in the face of negative GDP 
growth. 
 
Also, it can be argued that in the presence of rapid growth in the petroleum sector 
earnings, the economy faced a growing incentive to direct capital formation to this 
sector at the expense of other sectors. This is demonstrated by the petroleum 
sector’s 60% contribution to the country’s export revenue [Aerts, Cogneau, 
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Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000]. This incentive to focus capital formation to 
a single sector works against the development of other sectors, and on a broader 
scale, it counters export diversification. This in turn makes the economy more 
vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
4.2.2 Crisis Period 
In 1987, in the face of growing budgetary deficits, government investment in 
fixed assets rapidly fell. In the face of negative GDP growth, the country’s GDP 
percentage of gross capital formation fell from 24.7% in 1987 to 20.9% in 1988. 
This was the first sector to be negatively affected by the government expenditure 
reduction strategy. Through this decision it can be argued that the government’s 
investment policy orientation was inclined towards addressing its short term needs, 
as the economy faced an economic crisis. Within this period, foreign financial 
investments stayed stable as spending on investment in local infrastructure 
through gross capital formation fell, as the country borrowed to finance the 
budgetary deficit. [Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000] 
 
Gross capital formation fell further in 1989, thus demonstrating a fall in the 
country’s future potential to produce and therefore generate GDP growth, 
considering the choice of the government to prioritize consumption expenses 
which grew while investment spending fell. The falling Gross Capital formation 
within this period therefore lays a foundation for the future difficulties faced by 
the country in its quest to trigger GDP growth through its infrastructural 
development. Hence the economy’s growing foreign debt within this period 
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covered its budgetary deficit and had no impact on the Gross Capital Formation. 
4.2.3 Post Crisis Period 
4.2.3.1 Recovery period 
The ESAF aimed at stimulating and improving investment in social and economic 
infrastructure. Through privatization, the government aimed at expanding 
investment in new infrastructures as well as developing the existing ones. In this 
light therefore, the transport sector enjoyed the creation of a road fund for the 
financing of the construction and maintenance of the country’s road network. This 
increment in the country’s gross capital formation comes with an institutional 
mechanism. This mechanism requires financial and operational audits twice a year. 
This is expected to improve the choice of projects being financed and to 
strengthen the efficiency of executions within the road construction sector. 
(Cameroon Authorities, IMF, and World Bank Staff, 1999) 
 
Not only did this program seek to strengthen the institutional dimension of Gross 
Capital Formation within the economy. It also sought to raise the country’s 
Capital investments to a stable value of 20% of its GDP. By improving the 
efficiency of investment in infrastructure, it can be argued that the state expects to 
ease its task in stimulating consumption, earning taxes from the consumed 
products, and therefore using the locally raised revenue from taxes to finance 
future investment, thus depending less on foreign debt and unstable export 
revenue earnings.  
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Following the ESAF, in 2003/04, the country’s external reserve deficit dropped by 
2% of the country’s GDP [International Monetary Fund, 2005, p: 10], 
demonstrating an overall improvement in the country’s exports in the mist of 
relatively stable export prices (See Annexes 1-5). Considering the government’s 
strong quest for stability through the reduction of reserve deficits, the rise in 
export revenues did not affect the country’s foreign debt balance, its Gross Capital 
formation, or its GDP growth. Rather, the country’s foreign debt balance falls due 
to debt relief in the absence of any significant impact of the foreign debt on Gross 
Capital formation.  
 
4.2.3.2 HIPC and Capital investments 
The achievement point of the HIPC initiative had no significant impact on the 
country’s Gross Capital formation. Following the decision point of the HIPC 
initiative (2000), funds were made available for investment in infrastructure. This 
led to a 5% rise in the country’s GDP percentage of Gross Capital Formation. This 
stayed stable until after the achievement point of the HIPC initiative in 2006. 
Within this period, the economy experienced a slight fall in its GDP growth. 
 
Resource allocations for the HIPC initiative in the year 2004 stood at CFAF 61 
billion. Yet, in the same year, the total value of approved projects equaled CFAF 
300 million (0.5% of funds made available). This failure to respond to the 
allocated funds with projects to be financed is attributed to high administrative 
procedures in the provision of funds to the entitled ministries. [International 
Monetary Fund, 2005; p. 12] This friction in the spending of resources allocated 
60 
 
to stimulate growth in a slow growing economy can be argued to be an 
institutional weakness associated with high transaction cost.  
 
The second hypothesis which suggests that foreign debt has a positive impact on 
Gross Capital Formation is not fully accepted, considering the fact that the foreign 
debt was not enough to cover budgetary deficits in the crisis period. Considering 
the slow pace of investment of funds allocated for project financing during the 
decision point of the HIPC initiative, high transaction cost can be said to make 
Gross Capital Formation less responsive to foreign debt. This demonstrates a 
weak relationship between foreign debt and Gross Capital formation, as foreign 
debt tends to be unproductive. Thus, regarding the conceptual framework, a 
failure to efficiently utilize foreign debt will lead to a failure to stimulate 
consumption and fiscal revenue. This will therefore keep the economy dependent 
on foreign debt in the absence of GDP growth. 
 
4.3 To what extent did the rise in Cameroon’s foreign debt level improve the 
GDP percentage of the country’s fiscal revenues in the long run? 
4.3.1 Pre Crisis Period 
Between 1980 and 1985, petroleum revenues served as the strongest source of 
direct taxes in the economy. Within this period, the percentage contribution of 
such fiscal revenues to the GDP rose from 8 to 12%, as the direct tax rate on 
petroleum exports rose from 40% to 70% (Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, 
& Roubaud, 2000, p. 28). It can therefore be argued that such a rise in the 
percentage tax contribution of a single product to the country’s global tax revenue 
justifies the government’s incentive to reduce public investment in other sectors of 
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the economy.  
 
Increased investment in the petroleum refining sector led to a rise in the 
percentage GDP contribution of the manufacturing segment to 35% of the 
economy at the expense of the agric segment of the economy (20%), having a 
negative impact on the country’s export diversification. This would in the long run 
reduce the alternatives of reaction to falling fuel prices, given the limited 
alternative sources of revenue. 
 
Thus the economy’s increased dependence on petroleum export income taxes 
relatively reduced the country’s dependence on foreign debt before the economic 
crisis. But the strong dependence of income taxes on the value of the country’s 
leading export (petroleum) only postponed the country’s dependence on foreign 
debt to the era after the fall of fuel prices; when taxes could not be earned from 
low priced petroleum.  
 
4.3.2 Crisis Period 
Cameroon’s fiscal policy allocated high tax rates on the petroleum exploitation 
sector. This created an unfavorable environment for the growth of this sector. As a 
consequence, it turned investors away from the country. [Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, 
de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000, p: 35] The fall in fiscal revenues earned within the 
country in the mid 80’s, and consequently, the increasing dependence on foreign 
debt, can be associated to this tight fiscal policy on the petroleum exploitation 
sector. This tendency was later on reversed by the rise in petroleum prices which 
62 
 
followed the invasion of Kuwait (Iraq) in 1990. 
 
Contrary to this opinion, the government fiscal policy which fixes high tax rates 
on the petroleum sector could be used simultaneously as a means of controlling 
the growth of this sector (to improve export diversification) and maximizing 
government income from petroleum taxes, which could be advantageous in the 
stimulation of GDP growth in the long run on condition that the high revenues 
were used to implement export diversification projects.  
 
Investment in petroleum exploitation comes with no commitment on the investors 
to develop infrastructure. Therefore, the only means by which the government can 
ensure infrastructural development via the super profits arising from petroleum 
exploitation is by the resulting fiscal revenues. Also, the high stakes (66% shares) 
held by the government in the National Refinery Company, SONARA, (US 
Department of the interior, 2009) increases the magnitude of the loss suffered by 
the state in the case of falling petroleum prices, given that it loses net income and 
fiscal revenues. This increases its dependence on foreign debts. 
 
In 1985/86, following initial signs of the exhaustion of petroleum deposits, the 
government adopts fiscal policies which seek to attract petroleum exploiting 
companies towards the discovery of new oil deposits in the national territory 
[Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000, p: 37]. Such a policy is 
oriented towards the short run without consideration of the fiscal policy 
orientation in case of eventual oil discovery, could have a negative impact on the 
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country’s investment environment and therefore cannot be growth enhancing in 
the long run. 
 
The economy’s excessive dependence on petroleum revenues cannot be over 
emphasized. Considering the high tax rates on petroleum income compared to 
income earned from other sectors, the government faces a limited incentive in the 
harness earnings from other sectors, therefore prolonging its dependence on 
petroleum earnings [Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000, p: 52]  
 
This dependence of the fiscal policy on revenues earned from a single export 
compromises the coutry’s financial stability. By depending more on taxes earned 
from one export whose prices the economy does not directly control, the 
government’s control of its fiscal earnings are subjected to external shocks and are 
therefore uncontrollable. This therefore implies a greater dependence on foreign 
debt financing, and a failure to use the existing stock of foreign debt to generate 
consumption in other sectors of the economy, which ought to be taxed to generate 
stablized GDP growth from within. 
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4.3.3 Post Crisis Period 
 
Fig 13 Periodic Partition of GDP percentage of fiscal revenue 
Source: Yang & Nyberg, 2009 
 
4.3.3.1 Economic recovery  
The ESAF was guided by a board of experts from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs 
Department to evaluate the country’s tax system and propose solutions to existing 
difficulties. It sought to enhance fiscal earnings through which it could meet the 
growing social spending needs within the economy. This was achievable through 
the implementation of major tax reforms which constituted the implementation of 
a tax on global income as well as property, and the widening of the tax base. 
 
Following the ESAF, in 1998/99, it can be argued that the policy paper’s 
objectives were achieved, given that the concentration of the country’s fiscal 
revenues on the petroleum sector earnings was beginning to be diluted (Cameroon 
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Authorities, IMF, and World Bank Staff, 1999). This was achieved by the effective 
implementation of the Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1999. The results of this policy 
were positive as the country’s percentage contribution of taxes to GDP registered 
a 20% all time peak between 2000 and 2001 (Yang & Nyberg, 2009).  
 
There is therefore a need to further reduce the economy’s dependence on the 
country’s external revenues (e.g. foreign debt or export earnings) to stabilize GDP 
growth. Considering the fact that Cameroon is not a price maker, but rather a price 
taker in the global market of primary products, it tends to have less control of its 
export revenues. It can therefore be claimed that the 20% percentage contribution 
of tax earnings to GDP demonstrates the strong need to go beyond seeking to 
enhance earnings from the non-petroleum sectors. It creates the need to strengthen 
institutions to broaden the country’s tax base. Such institutions are expected to 
enhance the enforceability of polices implemented by the ESAF aimed at reducing 
of tax exemptions, and creating a system to make tax payer registration and 
identification necessary. 
 
The weak fiscal management within the economy in 2004 resulted from weak 
fiscal administration. This emerged from the sudden drift of activities to the 
country’s informal sector, in 2003, in the absence of adaptation of the fiscal 
administration [International Monetary Fund, 2005; p 10]. This slow adaptation 
limits the government’s ability to raise revenue from domestic sources to finance 
its growing capital investment needs, and thus, negatively influences growth 
stability. In the further future, if this phenomenon prevails, foreign debts will be 
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the only source of capital investment. This will set the stage for a future foreign 
debt crisis as long as the economy does not develop a mechanism for the 
collection of taxes expected to result from consumption stimulated by government 
spending. 
 
4.3.3.2 HIPC initiative and Fiscal revenues 
Following the decision point of the HIPC initiative (2000), the contribution of the 
country’s fiscal revenue to its GDP continuously fell until 2004 (Yang & Nyberg, 
2009), when the IMF recommended increased government attention to the 
implementation of fiscal targets with medium term perspectives [International 
Monetary Fund, 2005; p. 14]. The HIPC funding in this case acted as a substitute 
to fiscal earnings which dropped by 5% of GDP between 2000 and 2004 (Yang & 
Nyberg, 2009). In this light, the HIPC’s decision point, through the easily 
accessible funding allocations, can be argued to have triggered negative impacts 
on the country’s domestic fund raising potential, and therefore increasing the 
economy’s dependence on foreign debt. 
 
In this light therefore, the third hypothesis which suggests that the country’s 
foreign debt has a positive impact on the percentage contribution of fiscal 
revenues to GDP is rejected. The fiscal revenues are still tied to the petroleum 
sector, and the tax base is still relatively narrow after the rapid growth of the 
country’s foreign debt. The substitutive effect of HIPC funding on taxes 
demonstrates the fact that the availability of foreign funding has a negative impact 
on fiscal revenues. 
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4.4 How have the country’s foreign debt management institutions and its 
major creditors affected the foreign debt to GDP growth relationship?  
4.4.1 Pre Crisis Period 
According to Aerts et al (2000), Cameroon’s transition from a centralized 
government system to a democracy meant a new social need. In this case the new 
form of decision making which came to be applied in the late 80’s, with the 
coming of democracy. This called for a stronger involvement of individuals in 
decision making. The alignment of the population with the government’s 
objectives is achievable only in the presence of efficient institutions. Such 
objectives include the establishment of policies which will lead to long run 
foreign debt sustainability.  
 
The transition of the Cameroon economy from high growth in the late 70’s to 
negative growth in the mid 80’s strongly questions the efficiency of the country’s 
policy making mechanism and its public sector management. This is explained by 
the rapid increase in government spending (especially current expenditures which 
include salaries), following the rise in petroleum earnings (Aerts, Cogneau, 
Herrera, de Monchy, & Roubaud, 2000). This in mind, the country’s economic 
policy managers were expected to take advantage of the high earnings from 
petroleum products, as a means to finance export diversification and reduce the 
adverse effects which could arise from falling petroleum prices. Failure to do so 
can be interpreted as government inefficiency which is demonstrated by the 
devastating impact of the falling petroleum prices in 1985. 
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It can therefore be argued that the country’s foreign debt was triggered by the 
failure to consider uncertainty as the economy developed euphoria in the face of 
the economic upturn arising between 1976 and 1984. This led to an economic 
policy framework within which export revenues occupied a central role in the 
financing essential current government expenditure. This policy framework 
proved the limitations of government efficiency in the 1980’s in the face of violent 
fluctuations in the prices of all the country’s primary export commodity products.  
 
The slow government policy response to falling revenues is observed between 
1982 and 1986, when the country’s GDP growth settled at 8%, the growth of 
salaries paid to the public service stayed consistently at 12%, 4% greater than 
GDP growth [Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000 p. 19]. This 
demonstrates a consistent growth in spending in the face of falling revenues after 
1985 and therefore a deepening of the balance of payment deficit. This turned out 
to contribute to the rapid growth of the country’s foreign debt stock in an effort to 
cover the balance of payment deficit.  
 
4.4.2 Crisis Period 
Following the sharp fall in the public revenues in 1986, total public expenses still 
rose by 20%. Also, between 1985 and 1988, government revenues fell by 29%, 
while government spending fell by 16%, far below the fall in revenues (Aerts, 
Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, & Roubaud, 2000, p. 49). This late adaptation of 
government spending to revenues defines the degree of discipline demonstrated 
by policy makers. It paves the way for future inertia in the use of automatic 
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stabilizers in managing future government spending needs in the face of a crisis. 
Such a decision will serve to increase the amplitude of a crisis resulting from 
budgetary deficit, and thus strengthens the need for foreign debts to trigger GDP 
growth following the exhaustion of national financial reserves.  
 
The contraction of public investment while increasing current expenditure can be 
interpreted as short term policy inclination. This emerges from an “obligation 
trap”. This is a situation in which the public sector’s commitment to current 
expenditure financing reduced the necessity if financing long term needs in capital 
investments. This can be argued to constitute an agency cost issue arising from the 
public policy inclination. Hence the public sector will face the incentive to pursue 
short term micro interests while international financial creditor institutions pursue 
long term macro interests of restructuring the economy and therefore stimulate 
GDP growth by financing capital investment. This divergence of goals of the 
institutions tends to increase the cost of financing, and therefore limits the 
propensity of foreign debt stimulating GDP growth. 
 
It can be argued that government inefficiency is greatly exposed by the occurrence 
of the economic crisis between 1985 and 1994. This is demonstrated by the 
impact of policies enhancing the reduction of public expenditure on the mass of 
the budgetary deficit. Despite the magnitude of measures to reduce government 
expenditure, budgetary deficits prevailed. These deficits stimulated demand which 
was a lot greater than the supply of debts from foreign creditors. (Aerts, Cogneau, 
Herrera, de Monchy, & Roubaud, 2000) The failure of the state policies to invert 
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the country’s budgetary deficit situation was responsible for the consistent growth 
of the country’s foreign debt and its failure to generate GDP growth.  
 
In 1985, the state, unable to fully finance its accumulated commitments, turns to 
local suppliers and banks, thus deepening the insolvency situation in the economy. 
[Aerts, Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000] This can be used to 
measure government efficiency. It can be interpreted as state-triggered systemic 
risk, whereby the state creates a liquidity crisis which infects their suppliers as 
well as the banking system. This dried out credits from banks, limiting their 
ability to serve depositors and reduced the companies’ ability to award credits, and 
therefore deepens the recessionary situation in the economy. Furthermore, after 
the failure of local loans to cover budgetary deficits, and the fall in the confidence 
within the banking sector which fell into a liquidity crisis, the state faced the 
obligation to finance its outstanding obligations towards the banking sector. The 
rise of Cameroon’s foreign debt in the absence of GDP growth in 1985 can 
therefore be attributed to the need to reestablish confidence in the banking sector, 
to help this sector enhance its contribution to GDP growth. 
 
Following the fall in public sector revenues in 1985, the country’s ministry of 
finance sought to reduce government spending in order to reduce the magnitude of 
the country’s Balance of Payment deficit. The first sector to get affected was 
capital investment, whose GDP percentage fell greatly in 1987. Next was the 
acquisition of materials for the manufacturing sector, which fell slightly in 1989 at 
the onset of the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank within the structural 
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adjustment program. Then, foreign investment of the government abroad dropped 
in 1991, to cover accruing interests on government loans, while the level of state 
subsidies fell a year later. And the last sector to get affected by the revenue 
reduction was the salary allocation to the national civil service which fell below 
the level from which it had been rising in 1985 when the crisis hit. [Aerts, 
Cogneau, Herrera, de Monchy, Roubaud, 2000, p: 55] This represents inefficiency 
in state policy which sought to increase consumption through rising salary 
expenses at the expense of gross capital formation for future growth enhancement, 
while simultaneously maintaining the level of foreign financial investments in the 
face of budgetary deficits.  
 
The negative control of corruption in the mid and late 90’s can therefore be 
attributed to the falling efficiency in the civil service which arose from falling 
motivation which came as a result of the continuous fall in the civil service 
salaries for two consecutive years :1992 and 1993.  
 
4.4.3 Post Crisis Period 
 
Fig 14 World Governance indicators’ value for Government effectiveness 
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Source: KKM Global Governance Perception indices 
 
4.4.3.1 Economic recovery 
The institutional development mechanism was guided by a Medium Term 
Expenditure framework (MTEF) which ran for three to five years starting from 
2000/2001, with closer monitoring, through quarterly budgetary execution 
reviews in the sectors through which GDP growth is sought (Cameroon 
Authorities, IMF, and World Bank Staff, 1999). This is expected to have 
accounted for the improvement and stabilization in the country’s governance 
perception indices in the years which followed 2000 as seen in the government 
effectiveness figure. This factor is influenced by the other institutional indicators 
(See Annex) 
 
The ESAF recommended a strong collaboration of state authorities with the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in creating awareness on 
governance issues, prior to an anti-corruption policy implementation in 1999/2000. 
This program also requested an improvement in the exercise of discipline in the 
collection and management of public finance statistics.  
 
It can be argued that this led to an amelioration of the country’s monitoring 
mechanism which controlled the objectives and achievements of the state budget, 
local and foreign debt, as well as the performances of state owned companies to 
ensure their growth enhancing potential. (Cameroon Authorities, IMF, and World 
Bank Staff, 1999). These policy evolutions support the argument which that there 
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has been a relative improvement in the country’s governance perception indices in 
the latter years of Cameroon’s economic recovery.  
 
This revenue earned from petroleum, which constituted 25% of the state’s total 
revenue in 2004 is managed by the National Hydrocarbons Corporation (SNH). 
This institution still faces the strong need for enhanced transparency and 
accountability, considering the regular untimely submission of its financial audit 
reports by local auditing firms [International Monetary Fund, 2005, p: 7]. Given 
the limited disclosure or publication of the financial information generated within 
this corporation which manages 70% or petroleum earnings, government 
effectiveness is quite questionable, as demonstrated by the KKM Global 
Governance Perception indices. 
 
4.4.3.2 HIPC initiative and institutions’ efficiency 
The HIPC initiative, prior to the completion point, created an incentive for the 
creation of institutions to enhance the country’s institutional efficiency. In spite of 
the creation of governance enhancing entities which include the ministerial 
anti-corruption departments, the office in charge of audits, and the constitutional 
court, most observers judge the country’s governance mechanism as relatively 
inefficient [International Monetary Fund, 2005; P. 14] It can therefore be argued 
that this initiative created a relative, rather than an absolute improvement in the 
country’s governance mechanism. It raised awareness on the need for institutions 
in the quest for debt sustainability. It can therefore be interpreted as a starting 
point in the use of institutional mechanisms to unlock the economy’s potential.  
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The IMF admits that the blame for failures in achieving the goals set in the 
country’s foreign debt and growth management is not entirely to be borne by 
government authorities. Rather, these are due to the changes in the definitions of 
performance targets by the fund, as well as the setting of unrealistic and 
unachievable goals by the fund. [International Monetary Fund, 2005; p. 14].  
 
The IMF authorities, despite their good intentions towards setting global financial 
stability, are hereby trapped in a state of bounded rationality, whereby the targets 
they set were not achievable, and so needed to be redefined. Such inefficiency 
from this International Financial Institution (IFI) leads to a question on whether 
they should be monitored or regulated. This has a negative impact on the 
incentives of the country’s insitutions as they seek efficient foreign debt 
management.  
 
It can therefore be argued that the admission of inefficiency in monitoring bodies 
like the IMF creates a moral hazard effect on their borrowers as they seek to bare 
more risk as well as inefficiently utilize the resources they make available. The 
“unconditional” availability of IMF credits therefore increases the moral hazard 
among the economies that are financed by this IFI, as the less efficient economies 
tend to attract financing. This is observed by the acceptance of Cameroon at the 
achievement point of the HIPC initiative in 2006, in spite of its relatively stable 
GDP growth and its rapidly falling debt to GDP ratio between 2000 and 2005 (See 
Annex). This comes a long way to question the necessity of a massive debt 
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cancellation program through the HIPC initiative in this relatively stable economy. 
Furthermore, it questions the incentive created in the mind set of the country’s 
foreign debt management, and the future of the country’s foreign debt dependence, 
and its ability to generate and stabilize growth using domestic sources.  
 
Considering the fact that only 0.5% of the resources made available for the HIPC 
fund was utilized (International Monetary Fund, 2005, p. 13), the country’s 
institutional framework can be argued to be one of the strong reasons why the 
country’s foreign debt cancellation and increased provision of financial resources 
tends to have no significant positive impact on the country’s GDP growth. This 
friction which leads to slow use of HIPC funds can be interpreted as a form of 
ex-ante high transaction cost which results from the high cost of identifying 
business partners, and drafting appropriate contracts and projects. Each of these 
demonstrates lack of trust and technical knowhow in the system. In general, it 
slows the flow of foreign funding to government spending. 
 
The quantitative (less than 150% debt to GDP growth) rather than the institutional 
conditionality focus of the HIPC initiative prevents the HIPCs from achieving 
long term debt sustainability results. Furthermore, the decision point of the HIPC 
initiative (2000) led to a relative enhancement of the country’s overall institutional 
efficiency. Then the country was admitted into the HIPC initiative’s achievement 
point in 2006. In the absence of an absolute improvement of the country’s 
institutional efficiency by the IMF and the World Bank; and in the absence of a 
political will of the government which has ruled the country for the past 29 years, 
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the economy will remain unable to raise taxes to finance capital investment. This 
will only help to enhance the country’s dependence on foreign debt, and thus pave 
the way for the country’s next debt crisis. Hence, regarding the fourth hypothesis, 
which suggests that the relationship between the local and foreign debt 
management institutions improves the foreign debt to GDP relationship, is 
rejected. This results from the fact that the impact of the relationship between 
local and international foreign debt management institutions has not led to a 
significant impact on the efficiency of domestic institutions which are the key to 
the development of the country’s GDP. 
 
4.5 Limitations 
1. Qualitative, therefore values are relative and not absolute. Therefore, this work 
simply disqualifies the fixed 150% debt to GDP ratio which stands as a 
measure of debt sustainability sought by the HIPC initiative. It therefore 
suggests that the debt to GDP ratio at which debt sustainability can be 
achieved depends on the efficiency of the institutions within the country. It 
does not go as far as prescribing a debt to GDP ratio at which Cameroon’s 
foreign debt will be sustainable. It recommends improved institutional 
efficiency, through which the economy will be able to repay its foreign debt 
without compromising its GDP growth.  
 
2. Focus is turned towards domestic, rather than international institutions 
designing. The country’s foreign debt is governed by contracts signed between 
the country’s representatives and its creditors. Therefore, a full analysis of the 
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impact of foreign debt on GDP growth is expected to study with equal 
precision the debtors, as well as the creditors. But this study focuses more on 
the debtors, paying little attention to how the creditors influence this 
relationship. 
 
3. This work does not deeply consider the political underpinnings which could 
have a deep impact on economic decision making within the economy. It 
therefore considers the country’s government as an entirely economic entity 
with basic social interests, rather than one with political and environmental 
constraints which could influence its spending and investment decisions, 
leading them contrary to GDP growth enhancement. 
 
4. The World Governance indicators are grossly interdependent on each other. 
They therefore portray institutional efficiency by comparing governance 
practices between selected of countries. Due to this interdependence between 
governance indicators, the attribution of the observed debt to growth 
relationship cannot efficiently be attributed to a specific indicator. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusion  
Birdsall & Williamson (2002) established critiques of the HIPC initiative and its 
ability to serve HIPCs’ long term social welfare and debt sustainability needs. 
This was done by taking consideration of two major opposing schools of thought. 
This debate tends to divide beneficiaries of this initiative into two groups: 
Countries too poor to earn adequate benefits from the initiative, and countries 
which are relatively endowed yet not properly managed. 
 
5.1.1 “Foreign debt down the rat hole” 
This concept is used to claim that developing economies as too wasteful and 
corrupt. It perceives the International Financial Institutions as being relatively 
loose with funding criteria, and therefore deepening the corruption problem, 
therefore keeping the developing countries within a vicious circle, in which there 
is the permanent need for foreign debt. 
 
5.1.2 “Poverty trap” 
Conversely, this concept claims that the International Financial Institutions 
provide relatively tight conditionality, and limited funding. With this in mind, the 
developing countries are too poor to retain any long run benefits from foreign debt, 
considering the fund supply-to-conditionality mix. 
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5.2 Cameroon’s position in the existing debate 
5.2.1 Debt and aid are so easy to get 
- Creditors are said to be partially responsible for the mismanagement of 
foreign debt, considering the fact that the choice of debtors is guided by a 
combination of bureaucratic and political reasons, in the absence of 
accountability, as the international financial institutions seek to meet lending 
targets rather than having long term agendas which attend to the true needs of 
the HIPCs.  
- In the case of Cameroon, the systemic failures which create friction within the 
economy, preventing foreign debt from creating sustainable GDP growth are 
not addressed as these debt relief programs are being administered. Therefore, 
the solutions they offer tend to be relatively superficial. 
 
- The institutional framework between the debtors and creditors, as well as the 
major debt relief actors, demonstrates increased political pressure for a 
speedier reduction of the country’s foreign debt. This would increase the waste 
of resources by debtor countries and fight against the tough decisions of 
donors. 
 
Cameroon’s admission into the decision point of the HIPC initiative (2006) in the 
mist or relatively stable GDP growth and falling debt to GDP ratios is a sign of 
pressure for a more speedy foreign debt reduction. Speedy debt reduction in the 
presence of a relatively stable economy reduces the country’s incentive to 
efficiently manage its foreign debt, and therefore could make decision makers 
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relatively more wasteful or highly risk seeking.  
 
5.2.2 Receivers of debt relief are often wasteful and corrupt 
- The relatively shallow quantitative dimension of the existing foreign debt 
management mechanisms does not run for long enough to adequately address 
the issue of governance. The enhanced HIPC initiative provided more 
resources and was faster, as countries could achieve completion point within 
nine months instead of nine years. They therefore leave the HIPCs relatively 
corrupt, thus questioning the long term efficiency of such a program. 
 
Cameroon falls within this category in the sense that this program brought about 
increased control from world governance bodies. The debt cancellation therefore 
only had a temporal effect on governance enhancement, leaving the levels of 
corruption relatively high in the long run, and therefore cancelling the institutional 
effect of the program in the long run. 
 
5.2.3 Debt relief covers immediate needs, hence the persistence of bad 
policy  
Considering the fact that the HIPC seeks to improve the social welfare within the 
HIPCs, the criteria for selecting eligible countries included the debt to export ratio. 
By reducing the expected debt servicing ratio, the creditors seek to free resources 
for social expenditure. In the presence of a poor policy mechanism, there is no 
transmission of the freed resources to the satisfaction of social needs.  
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The changes initiated in the HIPC initiative were relatively less inclined to the 
“Debt down the rat hole” debate. These changes favored of larger debt relief and 
softer conditionality in order to enhance the flight of HIPCs off the poverty trap. 
They are expected to have more favorable effects on very poor countries which 
could not grow in spite of good governance. The effects of this policy framework 
on economies with poor governance indicators could be destructive in the long 
run, thus making them more dependent on foreign debt. 
 
Regarding Cameroon’s governance indicators, it can be argued that the country 
falls among those with weak policy efficiency. Therefore, its economy can tolerate 
indebtedness as high as 100% of its exports and 30% of its GDP (World Bank and 
IMF, 2011). Its eligibility for debt relief under the HIPC initiative can be 
supported by the fact that, in 2004, before the decision point of the country’s debt 
covered 56% of its GDP, which exceeded the 30% threshold. Contrary to this, the 
country’s debt-to-export ratio was 67%, which is below the debt sustainability 
threshold, thus making the country’s eligibility to foreign debt questionable. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1 General Recommendations 
For improved efficiency of debt relief initiatives recommendations at the level of 
regulators should include: tighter conditionality within good macroeconomic 
policy and good governance. In case of failure of conditionality, debt relief should 
be awarded as remuneration to countries for their observation of good governance 
and efficient macroeconomic policy. (Birdsall & Williamson, 2002, p. 33) 
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According to Cohen & Vellutini (2004) low income countries, such as Cameroon 
need local debt surveillance mechanisms. These institutions should be designed to 
operate within the country’s financial markets. Here, they can benefit from the 
quantitative and institutional information held in these markets, to generate 
information which can be useful to future creditors. For enhanced power, 
credibility, and independence, these debt management monitors they need to be 
backed by a strong presence of interenational financial institutions. This will 
improve the management of the country’s foreign debt, keep it from growing 
beyond control, as well as guide foreign creditors to award loans in a growth 
enhancing manner.   
 
For small countries which lack the price making bargaining power on global 
markets, as they seek to establish the drivers of their economic growth on foreign 
markets, via export revenue, export diversification is a necessary measure for the 
prevention of future budgetary deficits. Through export diversification, the state 
budget will cease to depend on one type of resource for more than 40% of its 
export revenue, as is the case with Cameroon which still depends on petroleum for 
49.8% of its export revenues (Yang & Nyberg, 2009). This is expected to improve 
the absorption of external shocks resulting from price fluctuations on international 
markets, as rising prices of one export are expected to offset the falling prices of 
the other. 
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5.3.2 Recommendations under the existing debate 
Recommendations on Cameroon’s argued position 
 
Foreign debt down the rat hole 
 Conditionality in the provision of debt relief should be more disciplined, and 
increasingly be turned onto governance and policy rather than the eagerness 
to meet their credit award quota. 
 In case of failure of policy oriented conditionality, increased selectiveness of 
countries receiving debt relief should be used as a means of remunerating 
countries with good governance and policy, to serve as an incentive for the 
improvement of policy and governance in countries with poor performing 
policies. 
 
5.3.3 Recommendations under the  
Foreign debt and the Poverty trap 
 To ensure the trickledown effect of foreign debt to the population in the quest 
for poverty alleviation, the debt relief and new aid initiatives should be 
associated with programs in an institutional framework within which 
empowers the poor, giving them a voice in the government’s allocation of 
resources. 
 
5.3.4 Recommendations arising from the Conceptual framework 
 Through the debt management programs, policy adjustments should include 
modification of the institutional design. This design should be built in order to 
reduce transaction cost. By reducing transaction cost, the time interval 
between the receipt and investment of funds can be reduced by the 
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development of long term plans and projects which will come to reduce the 
cost of identifying business partners and restore trust in the system. 
 
 There arises the need to improve the governance mechanism of the country, in 
order to channel government revenue to growth enhancing projects. Therefore 
the major sources of government revenue need to be subjected to more 
frequent monitoring and increased transparency. 
 
 Considering the country’s limited tax base and its high GINI coefficient, a 
long term poverty reduction program will be needed to identify the population 
living on less than a dollar a day so that they may be included in the tax base. 
By this means, the enforceability of their fiscal obligations may be enhanced 
and their benefits from the countries infrastructural investments will be 
retransmitted to the government in order to boost tax revenues.  
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ANNEXES 
1.1 Petroleum Annual price index (indexmundi.com, 2011) 
 
1.2 Cocoa Beans Annual Price Index (indexmundi.com, 2011) 
 
1.3 Coffee Annual Price index (indexmundi.com, 2011) 
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1.4 Cotton Annual Price index (indexmundi.com, 2011) 
 
 
1.5Banana Annual Price per metric ton (indexmundi.com, 2011) 
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Cameroon’s Performances on HIPC Debt Sustainability Thresholds 
Source: World Bank database 2010 
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World Governance Indicators for Cameroon: Source KKM database 
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